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I Case No. 890426 
The plaintiff (appellant here) respectfully petitions the 
Court for rehearing. 
The present decision of the Court has overlooked authorities 
cited to the Court and misapprehends the ptate of current law. The 
decision adheres to an old line of cases which, for the most part, 
are factually inapposite and which were substantially modified by 
later decision of this Court. The decision misapprehends the 
import of those modifying decisions. The decision also overlooks 
other statements in treatises cited by the Court, which statements 
address the very problem presented by ^his case and suggest that 
the utilization of the new technology addressed in this case 
requires the need for further accommodation in the law rather than 
reliance on concepts suitable to a bygone era. 
The "waste water" cases which make up the principal part of 
the reasoning in the present decision dealt for the most part with 
water running from one piece of land to an adjoining piece of land 
and involved the dispute of one farmer with another farmer. Those 
cases speak of "recapture." No farmer is here "recapturing" water 
at the end of his field. Those cases for the most part dealt with 
an immediate physical proximity and an immediate time frame. We 
deal here with water that does not simply run off or seep from the 
end of one field to another but with water that over a vast area of 
hundreds and hundreds of acres has seeped into the natural water 
table that slopes from the cliffs on the west to Alvey Wash on the 
east and becomes part of a natural water course which in turn is 
part of the Escalante River System. Though there is only one 
plaintiff here, the decision affects the water of other farmers on 
Alvey Wash and sets a dangerous precedent that will have adverse 
consequences throughout this State. We do in fact deal here with 
water that has commingled with the natural water table every bit as 
much and more as in Stubbs v. Ercanbrack, but the present decision 
in referring to Stubbs v. Ercanbrack fails to acknowledge that. 
Moreover, we deal here with decreed water rights on a natural 
river system—water rights established for nearly a century—not 
just a claim asserted by an adjoining land owner. And these are 
rights recognized in a general adjudication proceeding to which the 
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defendant made not the slightest protest £nd with respect to which 
the pretrial order in this case and the defendant specifically 
acknowledge the decree in that proceeding as decreeing rights to 
this plaintiff. (Exhibit 77). 
It is respectfully submitted that th£ present decision of the 
Court mispercieves the actual meaning of the McNauahton case and 
treats it simply as a "waste water" case, whereas the proper 
interpretation and application of that decision is as explained 
beginning at page 8 of the Plaintiff's Rfeply Brief. 
The present decision of the Court acknowledges that East Bench 
Irrigation refused to adhere to the antiquated "waste water" cases 
and held that those decisions did not apply where the upper users1 
water returned to a natural system. The present decision restricts 
the meaning of East Bench to where the "water returned to the 
stream from which it was originally diverted." The language of 
that case, however, is not so restrictive. The case speaks of a 
"stream system," not merely the "stream" as this decision depicts 
it. "If such water after abandonment h^s re-entered a portion of 
the stream system from which it was originally appropriated . . . 
it becomes a part of that watercourse in legal contemplation as 
well as physically . . . ." (2 Utah 2d at 181, n. 6; 271 P.2d at 
457, n. 6 (emphasis added) quoted at page 5 of the present 
decision.) Even one of the treatises cited in the present decision 
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(the 1942 edition of Hutchins quoted at page 5 of the present 
decision) states that ,fIf such water after abandonment has re-
entered a portion of the stream system from which it was originally 
appropriated . . . it becomes a part of that watercourse in legal 
contemplation as well as physically, and from the standpoint of 
rights of use, it is just as much a part of the flow as is the 
water with which it is mingled" and may be appropriated. 
The distinction made in the present decision is artificial at 
best. It is not a distinction of substance and is not based on 
principle, as discussed at pages 3-5 of Plaintiff's Reply Brief. 
Decisions of such far reaching consequence as here involved should 
not be based on artificial concepts but should deal with realities. 
The fact that the water has for a century been returned to a 
tributary of the Escalante rather than directly to the Escalante 
should be of no consequence. Other courts have so acknowledged. 
In Mannix & Wilson v. Thresher, 26 P. 2d 373 (1933), the Montana 
court long ago held that a lower user's right to return flows 
transported from one stream to another in the same river system as 
a result of an upper user's appropriation is entitled to protection 
against changes in the upper user's manner of use. The 
artificiality of the distinction drawn in the present decision of 
this Court is shown by the example at page 4 of Plaintiff's Reply 
Brief. A decision as far reaching as the one here made must rely 
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on hydrological realities and not artificial barriers. The 
difference in ten feet or ten thousand feet on the same river 
system should make no difference. The ten feet or the greater 
distance on a tributary does not change the hydrological facts. 
The enlightened decision of this C0urt in East Bench dealt 
with fundamental principles. The most fundamental concept of the 
law of this State is that all waters in ^ his State, whether above 
or under the ground, are public waters. They are the property of 
the public. Beneficial use is the basis, the measure, and the 
limit of all rights to the use of water in this State. Even if one 
has acquired a water right, what water is not beneficially used 
belongs to the public. The water right of the defendant New 
Escalante Irrigation Company and its shareholders was and is so 
circumscribed. The defendant Irrigation Company's water right was 
not a totally consumptive right. The right which it acquired to 
use the water of this State was a right to take water from the 
Escalante System and to return part of th&t water to the system for 
the use of others on that system. Jt was a partially non-
consumptive use. This Court in East B^nch recognized this very 
principle in noting that in that case, as here in this case, it was 
clear "that a large percentage of such waters awarded to them [the 
irrigation company] have not been consumed by such use". The Court 
there recognized that 
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The lower users have acquired a vested right to use all 
the unconsumed waters which would come down the stream to 
them under the use made of the water by the upper users 
and the conditions existing at the time they made their 
appropriations. The upper users cannot by a change in 
place of diversion or by a change in the place or nature 
of use consume more water than would have been consumed 
without the change and thereby deprive the lower users of 
their right to use such waters without impairing the 
rights of such lower users. 
271 P. 2d at 454. 
This concept that the "consumption11 may not be changed was 
repeatedly emphasized by the Court. (271 p.2d at 456-459.) Yet 
the present decision permits the Irrigation Company to expand the 
partially non-consumptive use it acquired by its appropriation to 
a new and totally consumptive use. 
The court in East Bench repeatedly referred to changes in the 
"manner" or "nature" of the use as being prohibited if it impaired 
the quantity of water reaching lower users. The decision was not 
restricted to a change in the type of use. It matters not that the 
defendant here is still using the water for irrigation; it has, 
nonetheless, changed the "manner" of so using the water. East 
Bench confirmed an expansive concept in the law of this State which 
is a necessary concept to balance the use of the waters of this 
arid State to the fair and beneficial use of all. Indeed, we are 
here committed by necessity to using waters "over and over again", 
to use the words of East Bench, and lower and even subsequent 
appropriators are and ought to be entitled to rely on the ability 
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to re-use water not previously placed to beneficial use when 
investing in their farms and wresting the land from wasted 
sagebrush. We have clearly here a change in the manner of use 
which without question impairs the rights of lower users who have 
relied on that water for decades. 
Even if one were to still consider the water here involved as 
"waste" water rather than water commingled with the natural water 
table and water allowed to flow to a natural water course, the 
cases have recognized that even with "waste water" a subsequent 
user should be protected. The trend away from the rigid concepts 
applied in the present decision began to surface as early as 1921. 
In United States v Hacra, 276 Fed. 41 at 46 (D. Idaho 1921), the 
court explained that where for 18 years a water company and its 
stockholders "had permitted the water to pass from their lands into 
a natural channel physically tributary to the stream from which it 
had been originally diverted, and to fwaste1 in a very real sense," 
and the defendant lower user had made beneficial use of a part of 
that water "during all of which peniod the canal company 
continuously permitted the water to waste and manifested no 
intention to recapture or again to use it," the case was such that 
the canal company "must be held to have abandoned such right as it 
may have had" and could not reclaim the water "to the detriment of 
one who in good faith had appropriated it and was using it for 
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beneficial purposes." That case, though certainly not binding on 
this Court, is instructive to show a virtually identical situation 
where the water was not totally consumed and was returned to a 
tributary stream. There, an enlightened view of the law would not 
permit the lower user to be devastated. 
The present decision acknowledges that it is undisputed that 
the sprinkler system is twenty-five percent more efficient than the 
prior flood irrigation system. There was extensive and uncontra-
dicted expert testimony establishing this point. No one disputes 
that. Yet the decision appears to take off on the concept that the 
Irrigation Company is not now irrigating more acreage than it did 
prior to installation of the system. That can not be so—the 
twenty-five percent saved has gone someplace where it did not go 
before. No one can dispute that. We need not get into a 
calculation of the number of acres that the old appropriation 
rights might conceivably have allowed the Irrigation Company to 
irrigate. The point is that it obviously was not irrigating all of 
those acres under its prior manner of using the water in flood 
irrigating. Contrary to the inference in the present decision, no 
one has suggested that the new system "makes water," and it is not 
a matter of the "crops consuming more water." There is no evidence 
to that effect, and the suggestion is difficult to understand. The 
same crops have been planted since installation of the sprinkler 
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system as before. The fact is that the tyenty-five percent of the 
water that once joined the natural water table and returned to the 
natural water course is now used to water acres not previously 
watered. It is irrelevant whether the water is being used to 
irrigate the 2712 acres decreed. All pf those acres were not 
previously being watered. The twenty-five percent is not going 
down Alvey Wash; it is not being consumed by the plants. It is 
being used to water acres not previously watered. No reasonable 
mind can question that. It makes no difference that the acres may 
or may not be within "decreed" acres. Water not previously 
consumed by the defendant and which was beneficially used by the 
Alvey Wash users is now consumed by the defendant. That is the 
point, and there can be absolutely no argument about that. 
The failure to file the change application should not be so 
easily disposed of as the present decisiqn seems to do. The Court 
has misapprehended the legal point concerning the requirements of 
proof. If New Escalante had filed a chahge application as it was 
required by the statute to do, it would have been required to 
show—it would have been its burden to show—that its proposed 
change would not impair the rights of otfier users. It should not 
be permitted to avoid that requirement by simply ignoring the law 
by not filing the required change application. It should still 
have that burden here. It is a fundamental concept embedded in 
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Utah law and in its statutes that a change can not be made if it 
adversely affects others, and it is required that the party making 
the change sustain the burden of so showing. By written statement 
of the State Engineer's office responsible for administering this 
water, made in direct response to inquiry made by the defendant, 
the State Engineer's office would have required "that the flow from 
Alvey Wash must now be further supplemented from irrigation company 
shares." (See discussion at pages 21-22 of Plaintiff's Reply 
Brief.) 
Lest there be any misunderstanding, no one is here trying to 
force the Irrigation Company defendant to continue to appropriate 
and transport water from the Escalante River. If it does not wish 
to do so, it can abandon its appropriation and the water will 
continue in the Escalante and the plaintiff and her fellow users on 
Alvey Wash or any others would be entitled to appropriate that 
water from the Escalante. But if the water is to continue to be 
used by the Irrigation Company under its prior appropriation, that 
appropriation is circumscribed by the conditions of use and the 
amount of water consumed as part of that appropriation over the 
last century. The present decision, in stating that "so long as 
New Escalante diverts only that volume of water to which it is 
entitled, it should be allowed to make the most efficient use of 
it" (page 9), improperly looks to diversion and not to beneficial 
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use as the measure of New Escalante's right. New Escalante's 
right, as discussed above, was a right that allowed for use of 
water by others, and although New Escalar^ te and every other water 
user in this State has the right to improve efficiency, it may not 
do so to the extent that exercise of that right impairs the rights 
of others. 
The present decision of the Court quotes at page 6 from a 
later edition of Beck et al. a treatise not cited in the briefs but 
referred to in oral argument, but the decision overlooks an 
important statement in the prior (1972) edition of that treatise 
which was quoted at argument. That statement points to the need 
for articulation of the proper application of the law that is here 
urged upon this Court. At page 80 of volume 5 of the 1972 edition 
of that treatise reference is made to the problems presented by the 
application of new technology. By the sentence at page 80 which 
reads, "The user may insist that because of new practices the duty 
of water is changed and therefore the irrigator may claim that he 
is entitled to expanded uses," the author^ infer that such expanded 
uses ought not to be permitted. In discussing the amount of water 
beneficially consumed in irrigating practices, the authors (one of 
whom was counsel for the defendant in tWis case) acknowledged in 
that edition that "modern sprinkler-type irrigation" presents new 
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dimensions to old problems. (5 Beck et al. Water and Water Rights 
(1972), p. 80.) It is there acknowledged that 
The need for careful measurement and understandable rules 
is clear if better water allocation and water-saving 
practices which will not impair existing rights are to be 
encouraged. Conflicts in this area will probably 
increase and raise additional questions related to the 
duty of water, beneficial use, seasonal uses, and changes 
in places of diversion and use. (Id. p. 81. Emphasis 
added.) 
There, citing an Arizona case, the authors state in a footnote that 
that case "emphasizes that the saved supply reverts to the public 
and is subject to appropriation" and that "in most areas the amount 
saved is theoretically available to supply prior appropriators who 
are receiving a short supply from an over-appropriated stream." 
Thus, that treatise and those authors recognized that the water 
saved by the use of new sprinkler technology should be utilized as 
the plaintiff here requests and as the State Engineer would have 
required had the defendant sought the permission for its change 
that our statutes require.1 
1
 The new edition with different authors does not appear to 
treat the impact of change in technology. In quoting from a 
different portion of the 1991 edition, the present decision does 
not consider all of the language quoted. That language includes 
the explanation that "the basic exception to allowing recapture is 
where the portion that would be subject to recapture has become 
return flow, that is finds its way back to its source. At that 
point, if not before, it becomes tributary water and subject to the 
call of the stream." We do indeed deal here with return flow. To 
say otherwise requires the adoption of the artificial distinction 
discussed above, and the law ought not to utilize a distinction 
like that. 
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We do not here attempt "to compel Nefrr Escalante to allow the 
water applied to irrigation to run off their shareholders1 lands1* 
as the present decision seems to perceive (page 10)• That would 
indeed be contrary to sensible water policy. But we do request, 
just as the treatise just referred to suggests, that the amount of 
water saved by new technology should in part be utilized to supply 
those users whose supply has been reduced by the new technology. 
This case depends on fundamental principles, not on what one 
treatise or another may say in attempting to reconcile conflicting 
cases; nor does it depend on labels used in old cases. The Court 
today, in this era, should not be bound by "pigeonhole1* 
classifications of yesteryear. New technology presents the 
opportunity for new thinking. The most fundamental principles of 
water law discussed at pages 5 and 6, above, must be applied to new 
situations without being stuck to old trappings of "waste water," 
"recapture," etc. Those trappings, which may be applicable on 
other facts, have nothing to do with this case. The fundamental 
principles underlying all water law should be looked to here to 
balance the rights of all. This case presents this Court with the 
opportunity to advance the modern concepts of East Bench and free 
itself from the confusing pigeonholes of the past. 
This is not a case where there has to be one winner and one 
loser. This is not a case where hidebound concepts need cause a 
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win-lose situation either for the parties now before the Court or 
the myriad of water users in this State. The Court can here 
fashion, and has been requested to fashion, a decree that will at 
the same time encourage the use of new technology and yet protect 
other users. The evidence in this case is clear and undisputed 
that New Escalante can replace the loss suffered by the Steeds and 
all other users on Alvey Wash and still irrigate nearly twenty 
percent more acreage than it had been able to irrigate before the 
change to the pressurized sprinkler system. Modern law ought to 
accommodate modern technology and properly allocate the use of this 
scarce resource to all concerned and not force a straight jacket 
concept where other users of many decades are injured beyond 
repair. 
Respectfully submitted. 
GARDINER & HINTZE 
L. TT. \Gardiner, Jr. U 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
DATED: August 31, 1992. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This Petition for Rehearing is presented in good faith and not 
for delay. 
The foregoing Petition for Rehearing was served upon the 
defendant/respondent hereto by mailing a true and correct copy 
thereof this 31st day of August, 1992, to the following: 
Steven E. Clyde, Esq. 
CLYDE, PRATT & SNOW 
77 West Second South, Sijiite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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